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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of an order of the Second Judicial District Court in a civil case 
denying a motion to compel arbitration. Denial of a motion to compel arbitration is ap-
pealable under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-129. This Court's jurisdiction is also based 
upon UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
In a wrongful death action brought by the surviving spouse, did the trial court err 
by refusing to enforce an otherwise valid arbitration agreement entered into by the dece-
dent and his physician? (R. 6-19.) "A trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitra-
tion presents a question of law which we review for correctness." Docutel Olivetti Corp. 
v. Dick Brady Sys.y Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986). 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
In 2004, the Legislature amended UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-17, which relates to 
arbitration agreements in malpractice actions against health care providers, by inserting 
the following provision: 
(1) After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration agreement be-
tween a patient and a health care provider to be validly executed or, if the 
requirements of this Subsection (1) have not been previously met on at least 
one occasion, renewed: 
(vii) the agreement only apply to: 
(A) an error or omission that occurred after the agreement 
was signed, provided that the agreement may allow a person who 
would be a proper party in court to participate in an arbitration pro-
ceeding; 
(B) the claim of: 
(I) a person who signed the agreement; 
(II) a person on whose behalf the agreement was 
signed under Subsection (6); and 
(III) the unborn child of the person described in this 
Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B), for 12 months from 
the date the agreement is signed; and 
(C) the claim of a person who is not a party to the contract 
if the sole basis for the claim is an injury sustained by a person de-
scribed in Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B). 
2004 Utah Laws ch. 84 § 1. Based upon the Governor's signature, the effective date of 
the amendment was April 29, 2004. The act provides, however, in § 2, that "[t]his bill 
applies to an action for which a court of competent jurisdiction has not issued an order as 
of the effective date of this bill certifying the action as a class action in accordance with 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23." 
STATEMENT O F THE C A S E 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal in a civil case from a final order of the Second Judicial District 
Court of Weber County, Utah denying a motion to compel arbitration, entered April 6, 
2006. (R. 164.) Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal on May 5, 2006. (R. 178.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The decedent, Mark Bybee, committed suicide on February 20, 2004. (R. 1.) 
Mrs. Bybee asserted in her Complaint that Mr. Bybee died as a result of alleged medical 
negligence in Dr. Abdulla's treatment of Mr. Bybee for depression. (R. 1.) On May 23, 
2003, prior to receiving medical care from Dr. Abdulla, Mr. Bybee signed a document 
entitled "Arbitration Agreement." (R. 38.) The Arbitration Agreement signed by Mr. 
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Bybee provides that anyone making any claims as a result of the care he received, includ-
ing claims for wrongful death, would be required to arbitrate their claims. The agreement 
provides in pertinent part: 
Article 1: Agreement to Arbitrate: We hereby agree to submit to binding 
arbitration all disputes and claims for damages of any kind for injuries and 
losses arising from the medical care rendered or which should have been 
rendered after the date of this Agreement. All claims for monetary dam-
ages against the physician, and the physician's partners, associates, associa-
tion, corporation or partnership, and the employees, agents and estates of 
any of them (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Physician"), must be 
arbitrated including without limitation, claims for personal injury, loss of 
consortium, wrongful death, emotional distress or punitive damages. . . . 
We expressly intend this Agreement shall bind all persons whose 
claims for injuries and losses arise out of medical care rendered or which 
should have been rendered by Physician after the date of this Agreement, 
including any spouse or heirs of the patient and any children, whether born 
or unborn at the time of the occurrence giving rise to any claim (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as "Patient"). 
Article 2: Waiver of Right of Trial: We expressly waive all rights to pur-
sue any legal action to seek damages or any other remedies in a court of 
law, including the right to a jury or court trial, except to enforce our deci-
sion to arbitrate, to collect any arbitration award and to facilitate the arbitra-
tion process as permitted by the Utah Arbitration Act. 
* * * 
Article 7: Read and Understood: I (Patient or Patient's representative ) 
have read and I understand the above Agreement which has been verbally 
explained to me to my satisfaction. I understand that I have the right to 
have my questions about arbitration answered and I do not have any unan-
swered questions. I execute this agreement of my own free will and not 
under any duress, and I understand that my signing this agreement is not a 
requirement in order to receive medical services from Physician. 
(R. 38 (emphasis added).) A copy of the Arbitration Agreement is included in the Ap-
pendix. The Arbitration Agreement signed by Mr. Bybee and Dr. Abdulla complies with 
all requirements found in both UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-17 and §§ 78-31a-101, et seq., 
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including all of the newly codified requirements found in the 2004 amendment to the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court refused to enforce the Arbitration Agreement against Mrs. Bybee, 
reasoning that Mrs. Bybee could not be forced to arbitrate her wrongful death claims be-
cause she did not sign the agreement. As this Court recognized in Jensen v. IHC Hospi-
tals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997), however, Mr. Bybee was the master of his own 
claim and he held the right to determine the forum for any claim arising out of his pa-
tient-physician relationship with Dr. Abdulla. 
Mr. Bybee could have affected his claim in much more significant ways than sim-
ply choosing the forum for any claim he or his heirs might bring. He could have perma-
nently impaired or settled any claim he or his heirs may have had against Dr. Abdulla, 
binding Mrs. Bybee and his heirs. Because Mr. Bybee could have forever impaired any 
claim he or his heirs could bring, he likewise was free to affect to a lesser degree any 
claim he or his heirs could bring by, for example, pre-selecting the forum through use of 
an arbitration agreement. 
Mr. Bybee and Dr. Abdulla expressly intended that Mr. Bybee's heirs, including 
Mrs. Bybee, would be bound by the agreement. Dr. Abdulla, therefore, is entitled to re-
quire Mrs. Bybee to arbitrate her wrongful death claims which are specifically derivative 
of any claims Mr. Bybee could have brought against Dr. Abdulla had he survived. This 
is a question affecting not only the integrity of the contractual basis for the relationship 
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between physician and patient, but also the patient's rights of privacy and self-
determination. 
Although the trial court placed great emphasis on whether the 2003 or 2004 ver-
sion of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act applied, the arbitration agreement is bind-
ing on Mrs. Bybee and Mr. Bybee's heirs because the amendment simply clarified prior 
law concerning when medical arbitration agreements bind heirs of the patient. 
Mrs. Bybee is also bound by the Arbitration Agreement because of her position as 
an express third-party beneficiary of the agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DECEDENT, AS THE MASTER OF HIS OWN MEDICAL 
RELATIONSHIPS AND POTENTIAL CLAIM, WAS FREE TO 
STRUCTURE THAT RELATIONSHIP AND POTENTIAL 
CLAIM SUCH THAT HIS HEIRS ARE BOUND BY HIS DECI-
SION. 
The lower court reasoned that Mrs. Bybee was not bound by the Arbitration 
Agreement because she did not sign it and no rule of law or statute existed at the time the 
agreement was signed that bound her to arbitrate her wrongful death claims against Dr. 
Abduila. (R. 171.) This Court, however, has previously established that heirs bringing 
wrongful death claims are subject to the actions of the decedent, even actions that could 
impair or even bar the heirs' claims. 
In Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997), the decedent allegedly 
died as a result of medical malpractice committed four years before her death. Prior to 
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her death, neither she nor those acting on her behalf had filed an action for medical neg-
ligence, and the trial court ruled that the two-year statute of limitations barred the claim. 
The heirs appealed, arguing that the wrongful death was a separate wrong that accrued to 
them, not the decedent, and that the decedent's failure to pursue her claim was therefore 
not binding on them. This Court rejected their argument, holding that the decedent was 
the master of her own claim. "[T]he wrongful death cause of action is based on the un-
derlying wrong done to the decedent and may only proceed subject to at least some of the 
defenses that would have been available against the decedent had she lived to maintain 
her own action." 944 P.2d at 332. 
As one of the foremost authorities on the law of torts has observed, 
the rationale underlying the rule barring the heirs from bringing a wrongful 
death suit after the injured patient has brought suit on the underlying per-
sonal injury action is that "the injured individual is not merely a conduit for 
the support of others, he is master of his own claim and he may settle the 
case or win or lose a judgment on his own injury even though others may 
be dependent upon him." 
Id. (quoting W. Page Keeton et al, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, 
at 955 (5th ed. 1984)). 
Applying the rule of Jensen to the case at bar, Mr. Bybee was master of the terms 
of his professional relationship with Dr. Abdulla, including the terms for resolution of 
any dispute. Arbitration clauses often affect the substantive terms of the relationship it-
self, including the willingness of one or both parties to enter into the relationship. Be-
1
 Although Ms. Hipwell was in a coma from nearly the date of injury until her death in 
May 1992, she was represented by various sets of counsel who allowed the statute of 
limitations to run on her medical malpractice claim. 
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cause Mr. Bybee was master of his own affairs, his actions during his lifetime are binding 
on his heirs in attempting to recover based upon the treatment rendered pursuant to the 
agreement he signed. 
The trial court, however, without any discussion of this Court's holding in Jensen, 
rejected Mr. Bybee's Arbitration Agreement and thereby rejected his right to be the mas-
ter of his own health, life, privacy, and any claim arising out of his physician-patient rela-
tionship with Dr. Abdulla. The trial court erroneously found that because Mrs. Bybee 
had not signed the Arbitration Agreement, she could not be bound by it even though the 
claim she seeks to assert arises out of the relationship created by that agreement. 
II. THE CLAIMS OF HEIRS ARE SUBJECT TO DEFENSES 
WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN ASSERTED AGAINST THE DE-
CEDENT. 
According to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement, Mr. Bybee "expressly in-
tended] that th[e] Arbitration Agreement shall bind all persons whose claims for injuries 
and losses arise out of medical care rendered [by Dr. Abdulla] . . . including any spouse 
or heirs of [Mr. Bybee] . . . ." (R. 38.) Mr. Bybee also expressly intended that all "claims 
for personal injury, loss of consortium, wrongful death, emotional distress, and punitive 
damages" would be subject to arbitration. Id. 
As a general rule, the heirs of a decedent are bound by the contracts of the dece-
dent. The most obvious example of this is a release of all claims by the decedent prior to 
death. As this Court noted in Jensen, the "majority of states refuses to allow a decedent's 
heirs to proceed with a wrongful death suit after the decedent has settled his or her per-
sonal injury case or won or lost a judgment before dying." 944 P.2d at 332; see also 
-7-
Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50 f 14, 94 P.3d 915 (quoting the above phrase and asserting 
that the Jensen court agreed with the majority of the states that a decedent may win, lose, 
or settle his case before dying); Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 4th 748, 
757, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 182 (1993) ("[t]he decedent's express release of any 
negligence liability on the part of Paralift binds his heirs in this action and provides 
Paralift with a complete defense"); Rowan v. Vail Holdings, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 889, 895 
(D. Colo. 1998) ("if [the deceased] would have been barred from suing Vail because of 
the release, his parents will be barred from asserting their wrongful death claim under the 
above authority"); Kulling v. Grinders for Industry, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 828, 852 (E.D. 
Mich. 2000) (spouse bound by release of claims found in her deceased spouse's employ-
ment separation agreement). 
Mr. Bybee, therefore, had the ability to deny his heirs of any recovery by allowing 
the statute of limitations to run or to bind his heirs to a settlement disposing of any claim 
the heirs could bring. Indeed, if an injured person could not bind his heirs by contract, 
every settlement agreement, stipulation, and any other agreement that could adversely af-
fect how, when, or where an action is brought, maintained, or adjudicated would be in-
validated upon the death of the injured person. 
Consistent with that line of cases, Utah courts hold that heirs are bound by the 
agreements of the decedents from whom the claim is derived. For example, in Russ v. 
Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals 
ruled that a hold harmless agreement signed by the decedent was clear and unequivocal 
and prevented the heirs from bringing wrongful death and negligence claims. 905 P.2d at 
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906. Accord, In re Estate of Shepley, 645 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1982) (estate bound by 
contract of decedent). 
Similarly, in Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1989), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the heirs in a wrongful death action are subject to decedent's 
contributory negligence. Id. at 1155. Kelson involved the death of Kelson's son in a 
high-speed chase with police. Kelson brought a wrongful death claim against the police 
and a jury was permitted to apportion fault among the parties. Kelson was apportioned 
seventy-five percent of the fault and received no judgment. The Kelson court acknowl-
edged that "the heirs have 'a right to proceed against the wrongdoer subject to the de-
fenses available against the deceased, had he [or she] lived and prosecuted the suit.'" Id. 
at 1154 (quoting Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific R.R., 186 P.2d 293, 303-04 (1947), 
modified on other grounds, 112 Utah 218, 189 P.2d 701 (1948)). 
Courts in other jurisdictions also agree that the heirs are subject to the contracts of 
the decedent in wrongful death actions, including arbitration agreements. 
2
 See Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 379-80 (Colo. 2003) (en banc), cert, denied, 
540 U.S. 1212 (2004) (wife claiming wrongful death bound by husband's arbitration 
agreement with HMO, however, arbitration agreement not enforceable due to failure to 
comply with health care act requirements in obtaining the agreement); Ballard v. South-
west Detroit Hospital, 119 Mich. App. 814, 327 N.W.2d 370 (1982) (personal representa-
tive bound by decedent's arbitration agreement in wrongful death action); Jansen v. 
Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 342 NJ. Super. 254, 776 A.2d 816 (App. Div. 2001) (heirs 
bound by decedent's contract that included arbitration clause in negligence action against 
stock broker); Smith, Barney, Inc. v. Henry, 775 So.2d 722 (Miss. 2001) (wrongful 
conversion claim by heirs subject to arbitration clause in broker agreement); Collins v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 561 So.2d 952 (La. Ct. App. 1990) 
(same); American Bureau of Shipping v. Tenacara Shipyard, 170 F.3d 349 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(non-signatory insurance underwriter compelled to arbitrate); Seborowski v. Pittsburgh 
Press Co., 188 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 1999) breach of collective bargaining agreement claims 
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This Court should honor and enforce Mr. Bybee's right and intent to commit all 
claims arising out of his patient-physician relationship and agreement with Dr. Abdulla to 
arbitration. Wrongful death claimants have no right to excuse themselves from a hold 
harmless agreement signed by the decedent, to excuse themselves from a settlement 
agreement signed by the decedent, to excuse themselves from the decedent's failure to 
timely prosecute his claims, to excuse themselves from a decedent's contributorily negli-
gent conduct, or, as in this case, to excuse themselves from a decedent's valid arbitration 
agreement. Mr. Bybee and Dr. Abdulla clearly and expressly intended that Mrs. Bybee's 
wrongful death claims be arbitrated and this Court should enforce that agreement. 
by non-signatory beneficiaries of deceased employees compelled to arbitrate claims); In 
re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 659 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1981) (non-signatory transport 
company subject to arbitration as an agent of plaintiff); Briar cliffNursing Home, Inc. v. 
Turcotte, 894 So.2d 661, 665 (Ala. 2004) (estate of deceased nursing home patient re-
quired to arbitrate wrongful death claim); Wilkerson ex rel Estate ofWilkerson v. Nelson, 
395 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (husband and child of deceased patient re-
quired to arbitrate wrongful death claim against hospital); Pelz ex rel Estate of Pelz v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 367 F. Supp. 2d 711, 721 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (heirs required to arbi-
trate wrongful death claims that were based on contractual relationship between decedent 
and defendant); County of Contra Costa v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 47 Cal. 
App. 4th 237, 242, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628 (1996) (nonsignatories required to arbitrate 
where "a preexisting relationship existed between the nonsignatory and one of the parties 
to the arbitration agreement, making it equitable to compel the nonsignatory to also be 
bound to arbitrate his or her claim"); Bolanos v. Khalatian, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1586, 1591, 
283 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1991) (spouses, children and heirs of patients who have signed arbi-
tration agreements required to arbitrate medical malpractice claims, especially if the 
claims derive from treatment of the signatory patient); NORCAL Mutual Ins. Co. v. New-
ton, 84 Cal. App. 4th 64, 72-73, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683 (2000) (same; listing cases); Har-
ris v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 3d 475, 478, 233 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1986) (non-
signatory employees required to arbitrate pursuant to agreements signed by their employ-
ers). 
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III. UTAH STATUTES ANTICIPATE ENFORCEMENT OF ARBI-
TRATION AGREEMENTS AGAINST THE HEIRS OF MR. BY-
BEE. 
The Utah Arbitration Act anticipates that an arbitration agreement would apply to 
a decedent's heirs. This act provides that "[a] written agreement to submit any existing 
or future controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable" except under 
certain conditions not found or argued here. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-3; see also Lin-
don City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Utah 1981) (nothing prevents 
agreement to arbitrate future claims or disputes); Allred v. Educators Mut. Ins. Assn. of 
Utah, 909 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996) ("[tjhe Act supports arbitration of both present 
and future disputes"). 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act also specifically envisions the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements against persons other than the patient. The Act contemplates 
that all persons claiming damages, not just the patient, will be involved in, and thus 
bound by, the arbitration process: 
[T]he [arbitration] agreement shall require that 
(i) one arbitrator be collectively selected by all persons claiming 
damages; 
(ii) one arbitrator be selected by the health care provider; 
(iii) a third arbitrator be jointly selected by all persons claiming 
damages and the health care provider from a list of individu-
als approved as arbitrators by the state or federal courts of 
Utah. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-17(l)(b). 
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A single patient is typically the only physically injured party in a medical malprac-
tice action. It is clear, therefore, the legislature anticipated that arbitration agreements 
would encompass claims for damages other than those brought by the injured patient 
such as wrongful death and loss of consortium claims. Other courts have enforced arbi-
tration agreements against the spouse and heirs for wrongful death, see, e.g., Allen v. 
Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 379, 80 (Colo. 2003) {en banc), cert, denied, 540 U.S. 1212 
(2004)) (enforcement denied on other grounds), as well as persons claiming damages for 
loss of consortium who were not signatories to the arbitration agreement, see, e.g., 
Georgia Power Co. v. Partin, 727 So.2d 2 (Ala. 1998) (spouse's loss of consortium claim 
subject to employee's arbitration agreement). 
The 2004 amendment to the Act limits the enforceability of arbitration clauses 
against persons who are not parties to the contract only to the extent "the sole basis for 
the claim is an injury sustained by [the patient]." Given the status of Utah law regarding 
the status of a decedent as the "master of his own claim," this amendment is properly 
viewed as a clarification or limitation of prior law, not as an expansion of that law. It is 
not, as the lower court believed, a question of retroactivity. In considering the amend-
ment as a retroactivity issue, the lower court failed to recognize that so far as applicable 
to the facts in this case, the amendment was a reiteration of prior law, not a change to 
prior law. 
The Arbitration Agreement is valid and binding upon Mrs. Bybee and the district 
court erred by refusing to enforce the agreement according to Utah law. 
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IV. PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBI-
TRATION AGREEMENT BECAUSE IT GIVES EFFECT TO THE 
PARTIES' INTENT AND AVOIDS PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRI-
VACY CONCERNS. 
This Court has held that arbitration agreements are favored in Utah. See Allred v. 
Educators Mut. Ins. Assn. of Utah, 909 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996). In Allred, this 
Court unanimously upheld the enforceability of an arbitration clause in a long-term dis-
ability policy stating: 
The [Arbitration] Act supports arbitration of both present and future dis-
putes and reflects long-standing public policy favoring speedy and inexpen-
sive methods of adjudicating disputes. 
909 P.2d at 1265 (citation omitted). 
Other courts have expressed the concern that if an arbitration agreement cannot be 
enforced against the heirs or spouse of the patient absent the heir's or spouse's signature, 
a patient's privacy is jeopardized because "to authorize an intrusion into a patient's con-
fidential relationship with a physician as the price for guaranteeing a third person, even a 
spouse, access to a jury trial on matters arising from the patient's own treatment, poses 
problems of a particularly serious nature." Gross v. Recabaren, 206 Cal. App. 3d 771, 
782 (1988) (emphasis in original). 
The significance of a patient's personal privacy rights with respect to medical mat-
ters is accorded special protection by Utah's legislature, see, e.g., UTAH R. EVID. 506, 
(physician-patient privilege); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-17a-502(10) (prohibiting disclosure 
of confidential pharmacy records); § 58-44a-502(l) (prohibiting "disregard for a patient's 
dignity or right to privacy as to his person, condition, possessions, or medical records" by 
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a nurse-midwife), and the rules promulgated under the recently effective Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") (imposing significant fines, 
penalties, and/or jail time for non-compliance with privacy rules). Moreover, Utah courts 
have recognized that "a patient has a right of privacy and self determination as regards 
his or her own medical care." Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188, 198 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
The Gross court further explained that 
[i]t would appear indisputable that if spouses disagree on any decision re-
garding the terms of medical treatment, including the desirability of an arbi-
tration provision, the view of only one can prevail. Inasmuch as the patient 
is more directly and immediately affected, as between the two, the balance 
must weigh in that individual's favor. 
Gross, 206 Cal. App. 3d at 782. 
For those reasons, this Court should recognize the importance of Mr. Bybee's— 
and all patients'—privacy rights and rights of personal determination by enforcing the 
Arbitration Agreement as Mr. Bybee intended, in favor of arbitration of all "claims for 
personal injury, loss of consortium, [and] wrongful death" asserted by Mrs. Bybee. 
(R. 10.) 
V. MRS. BYBEE IS BOUND BY THE ARBITRATION AGREE-
MENT AS A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY. 
Some courts in other jurisdictions which have examined this issue have held that 
heirs are bound as third-party beneficiaries of the agreement to arbitrate. Under that 
analysis, although Mrs. Bybee did not sign the Arbitration Agreement, she is bound by its 
terms as a third-party beneficiary. 
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Third-party beneficiaries are those "'recognized as having enforceable rights cre-
ated in them by a contract to which they are not parties and for which they give no con-
sideration.'" Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council Inc., 976 P.2d 1213, 1218 (Utah 1999). 
"The existence of third party beneficiary status 'is determined by examining a written 
contract.'" Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109 f 11, 62 P.3d 440 (quotation omitted). 
Article 1 of the Arbitration Agreement provides that Mr. Bybee and Dr. Abdulla 
"expressly intend that this Arbitration Agreement shall bind all persons whose claims for 
injuries and losses arise out of medical care rendered or which should have been rendered 
by [Dr. Abdulla] after the date of this Agreement, including any spouse or heirs of the pa-
tient and any children." (R. 10.) Mr. Bybee and Dr. Abdulla created in Mrs. Bybee an 
enforceable right to arbitration. Arbitration was a significant benefit to Mr. Bybee and 
Dr. Abdulla as evidenced by their agreement. Among the benefits of arbitration include 
the "speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes," Allred v. Educators Mut. 
Ins. Assn. of Utah, 909 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996), and "giving effect to the intentions 
of the parties[ and] easing court congestion," Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 636 
P.2d 1070, 1073 (Utah 1981). As a further benefit, Mr. Bybee and Dr. Abdulla also spe-
cifically entered into the Arbitration Agreement intending that "arbitration proceedings" 
remain "private, not public," and requiring that the "privacy of the parties and of the arbi-
tration proceedings shall be preserved." (R. 10.) Mrs. Bybee expressly received the right 
to enforce arbitration as a third-party beneficiary. 
The trial court found that arbitration was not a benefit to Mrs. Bybee because Mrs. 
Bybee subjectively did not consider it a benefit and because it deprived her of a choice to 
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have a judicial resolution of her dispute. (R. 168.) This analysis, however, is erroneous 
because it is immaterial whether the beneficiary desires the benefit since it is the benefi-
ciary who seeks the other benefits of the contractual relationship between the parties. 
Mrs. Bybee seeks to recover from Dr. Abdulla based upon his physician-patient relation-
ship and yet Mrs. Bybee desires to avoid the Arbitration Agreement that formed a part of 
that relationship. Utah law does not permit the division of a contractual relationship in 
this manner. See, e.g., Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3 \ 12, 40 
P.3d 599. Hence, Mrs. Bybee may not bring her wrongful death claim based on the phy-
sician-client relationship without complying with the arbitration provision of that rela-
tionship. 
Mr. Bybee and Dr. Abdulla undertook the Arbitration Agreement not only for Dr. 
Abdulla's benefit, but also for Mrs. Bybee's and the heirs' direct benefit and affirma-
tively made this intention clear by naming Mrs. Bybee and Mr. Bybee's heirs in the terms 
and language of the agreement. Mrs. Bybee is bound by the terms of the Arbitration 
Agreement as third-party beneficiaries and the Court should order arbitration accord-
ingly. See Parsley v. Terminix In? I Co., 1998 WL 1572764 (S.D. Ohio) (arbitration 
agreement enforced against third-party beneficiary); Terminix In?I. Co., LP v. Ponzio, 
693 So.2d 104 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997) (same). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Dr. Abdulla respectfully requests that the Court 
reverse the district court's order refusing to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration 
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and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with the Arbitration Agree-
ment. 
DATED this J ^ day of August, 2006. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Brian P. Miller 
Kenneth L. Reich 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
N \21566\7\BRIEF DOC 8/30/06 
G^<-> 
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APPENDIX 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
LISA BYBEE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN ABDULLA, MD and JOHN DOES 1-
5, 
Defendants. 
DECISION 
Case Number: 050903397 
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan 
UNDISPUTED FACTS: 
1. On May 23, 2003, Mark Bybee, deceased husband of plaintiff Lisa Bybee, signed an 
Arbitration Agreement with defendant Dr. Alan Abdulla. 
2. The Arbitration Agreement provides that the parties would submit to binding arbitration for 
"all disputes and claims for damages of any kind for injuries and losses arising from the medical 
care rendered or which should have been rendered." 
3. The Arbitration Agreement further "bind(s) all persons whose claims for injuries and losses 
arise out of medical care rendered or which should have been rendered ... including any spouse or 
heirs of the patient and any children..." Decision 
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4. The Arbitration Agreement also represents that the Agreement was read and understood by 
Mr. Bybee and provides that signing the agreement is not a prerequisite to receiving medical 
services from the doctor. 
5. Lisa Bybee did not sign the agreement. 
6. Medical treatment was rendered to Mr. Bybee by Dr. Abdulla. 
7. On February 20, 2004, Mr. Bybee committed suicide. 
8. Lisa Bybee brings this action alleging that Dr. Abdulla committed medical malpractice in his 
treatment of Mr. Bybee and that she is entitled to damages for Mr. Bybee's wrongful death. 
DECISION: 
The court concludes that the Arbitration Agreement signed by Mr. Bybee purporting to bind 
Lisa Bybee, his wife, to the agreement to submit to binding arbitration is not enforceable as to 
Lisa Bybee. The reasons for this decision are set forth below. 
The threshold question is whether the 2003 version (enacted in 1999) or the 2004 version of 
Utah Code Ann. 78-14-17 applies. The applicable change from the 2003 version is that the 
legislature specifically added language in 2004 that expanded the individuals to whom an 
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Arbitration Agreement would apply. Prior to 2004 the statute at issue referred only to the 
applicability of the Agreement to the patient. In 2004 the following language was added: 
(vii) the agreement only apply to: 
(A) an error or omission that occurred after the agreement was signed, 
provided that the agreement may allow a person who would be a proper 
party in court to participate in an arbitration proceeding; 
(B) the claim of: 
(I) a person who signed the agreement; 
(II) a person on whose behalf the agreement was signed under 
Subsection (6); and 
(III) the unborn child of the person described in this Subsection 
(l)(b)(vii)(B), for 12 months from the date the agreement is signed; 
and 
(C) the claim of a person who is not a party to the contract if the sole basis 
For the claim is an injury sustained by a person described in Subsection 
(l)(b)(vii)(B) 
Plaintiff argues that the 2003 version of the applicable statute is applicable to the instant case 
because the claims arose before the 2004 version went into effect. Defendant argues that the 
2004 version is applicable and retroactive because the changes made were procedural rather than 
substantive. 
The court finds it critical to first analyze which version of the statute applies to the instant 
case for reasons which will become obvious in the latter portion of this opinion. 
At first blush, defendant's argument that the 2004 changes in the statute at issue are 
procedural only because it specifies only the forum in which disputes will be decided appears to 
have merit. However, upon further analysis, it is clear that it is not simply a procedural change 
that was enacted. Rather, the change fundamentally alters the party's substantive right of access 
to the courts. 
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Generally, a statute cannot be given retroactive effect unless the legislature expressly declares 
such an intent in the statute. Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988). However, if 
the statute changes procedural rather than substantive rights, the new statute will apply to all 
cases including those which have accrued or are pending actions. Pilcher v. State. 663 P.2d 450, 
455 (Utah 1983). This court is directed, however, to narrowly construe what is defined as 
procedural for the purpose of retroactive application of a statute. Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre 
Investment Co., 956 P.2d 257,261 (Utah 1998). 
Defendant's position that the statute's change is procedural only is in direct conflict with 
precedent. In Jenkins v. Percival 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court clearly 
states that the right to apply to the courts for relief from a perpetrated wrong is a substantive 
right. Justice Stewart in Jenkins states the following: 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution guarantees that courts shall be open and that 
every injured person shall have a remedy by due course of law. Even the most limited 
reading of this provision guarantees a day in court to all parties with potential liability... 
Justice Stewart goes on to state that binding someone who is not a party to an arbitration 
agreement to submit to arbitration would be depriving them of "this substantive right." Id- at 799. 
Because the change in the 2004 amendment is substantive rather than procedural, the court 
finds that it is not retroactive to a claim that allegedly arises before its enactment, specifically this 
case. Therefore, defendant cannot rely on the 2004 amendment to require Mrs. Bybee to submit 
her claim to binding arbitration. 
Defendant also argues that even if the 2004 changes to the statute are not retroactive, the 
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Arbitration Agreement is binding on plaintiff because the Agreement signed by Mr. Bybee 
explicitly binds her to arbitrate. Assuming for purposes of this decision that the claims asserted 
by Mrs. Bybee fall within the ambit of those to which the Agreement refers, the next question is 
whether such an agreement is binding as to Mrs. Bybee under the applicable state law governing 
contracts. (This court recognizes that the legislature may change common law by statute which it 
apparently did in the 2004 changes to the applicable statute; however, given the decision that the 
2004 amendments relating to binding of spouses are not retroactive, the court is bound to resort to 
an analysis of the applicable common law). 
It is a fundamental tenet of contract law that a contract is enforceable only between the parties 
to the contract. Wagner v. Clifton. 62 P.3d 440. 442 (Utah 2002). That rule of contract law is 
applicable to arbitration agreements. See Cade v. Zions First National Bank. 986 P.2d 1073 
(Utah App. 1998). In McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah. 20 P.3d 901 (2001) Justice 
Durrant elaborates on this principal and states the law as follows: 
Because parties to a binding arbitration waive substantial rights to formal public 
adjudication of their disputes, the Act demands, as a minimum threshold for its 
enforcement, direct and specific evidence of an agreement between the parties. Id. at 17. 
It is clear from the face of the Arbitration Agreement that plaintiff Mrs. Bybee did not sign 
the Agreement and there is no evidence that she otherwise agreed to be bound by the Arbitration 
Agreement. However, she still may be bound under the common law if she is deemed to be a 
third party beneficiary of the Agreement or if it can be concluded that Mr. Bybee was acting as her 
agent when he signed the Agreement. The defense urges the court to find both of these 
propositions to be true in this case. The court finds, however, that neither of these exceptions is 
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applicable to the instant case. 
First, a third party beneficiary is one who has enforceable rights pursuant to a contract 
to which they aren't parties and haven't tendered any consideration. Rio Algom Corp. V. 
Jimco. Ltd., 618 P.2d 497 (Utah 1980). In addition, the contract must make clear an 
intention to confer a "separate and distinct benefit upon the third party." Wagner v. 
Clifton, 62 P.3d 440, 441-442 (Utah 2002). 
It is fundamental that the beneficiary receive a benefit. The defense argues that Mrs. 
Bybee receives the benefit of having the right to require the defendant doctor to arbitrate 
her claim rather than having the case decided in court. They argue that arbitration is a 
more beneficial way to resolve legal disputes because it is speedier, less expensive and 
more private. That position ignores the possibility that if Mrs. Bybee does not wish to 
arbitrate but rather sees it to her benefit to proceed with her claim in court, the agreement 
deprives her of the substantial benefit of having that option. Enforcement of the 
Arbitration Agreement as to her would effectively deprive her of her "substantial right to 
judicial resolution of (her) dispute." McCoy supra at 15. It defies common sense to 
claim that Mrs. Bybee is a third party beneficiary to an agreement when the option she 
wishes to exercise, i.e., having her claim adjudicated in court, has been terminated by that 
agreement if it is enforced. Had the Arbitration Agreement provided the spouse the 
option of electing either arbitration or judicial resolution as to claims that 
the patient could not have brought such as in the instant case, wrongful death, then 
arguably she would have received a distinct and separate benefit of the agreement. 
DECISION 
Bybee vs. Abdulla 
Case Number 050903397 
Page Seven 
The second exception urged upon the court by the defense is that a husband may bind 
his wife to an Arbitration Agreement by virtue of their spousal relationship. Essentially, 
the argument is that Mr. Bybee acted as his wife's agent in agreeing to bind her to the 
Arbitration Agreement. They cite to the statutory provisions that provide for joint and 
several liability of a husband and wife for expenses of the family (Utah Code Ann. 30-2-
9). They also cite to Utah Code Ann. 30-2-8 which provides that either a husband or wife 
may appoint the other as their attorney subject to the right to revoke that appointment just 
as any other person would have. 
As to the family expense doctrine, if this case involved an action by the doctor to 
recover for medical expenses incurred by Mr. Bybee, Utah Code Ami. 30-2-9 may apply 
and a good argument could probably be made that Mrs. Bybee should be required to 
arbitrate those claims. Effectively she would step into the shoes of Mr. Bybee and 
probably should be required to submit to the limitations agreed to by Mr. Bybee on how 
the matter of a debt should be resolved.. That is obviously not the issue here. 
As to Utah Code Ann. 30-2-8, there is simply no evidence that Mrs. Bybee gave Mr. 
Bybee any power of attorney to enter into a contract with the defendant to which she 
would be bound. The more applicable section that establishes Mrs. Bybee's independent 
right to enter into contracts is found in Utah Code Ann. 30-2-2. That statute codifies the 
elimination of the common law restriction on a woman's right to contract. Utah Code 
Ann. 30-2-4 also makes clear that a woman may bring legal action separate from her 
husband and may "recover against a third person for such injury or wrong as if 
DECISION 
Bybee vs. Abdulla 
Case Number 050903397 
Page Eight 
unmarried..." Id. 
The defense also cites as authority for the proposition that Mr. Bybee could bind Mrs. 
Bybee to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement the statute which provides that a spouse 
may consent to health care for their spouse. Utah Code Ann. 78-14-5 (4)(b). The 
authorization for a spouse to consent to health care for another spouse has been limited to 
situations where the spouse in need of health care and is not capable of giving their own 
consent. It does not stand for the proposition that a husband may bind his wife to a 
contract to which she is not a party, has not agreed to, and which contract does not 
represent a family type of expense. 
The case of Jenkins v. Percival et al„ 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998) is instructive although 
the facts of that case are substantially different from those in the instant case. In Jenkins, 
supra, the plaintiff sought to enforce an oral agreement to arbitrate her personal injury 
claim against defendant Gerald Percival, Plaintiff alleged that her counsel and PercivaPs 
insurance adjuster entered into an oral agreement to arbitrate her claim after settling the 
personal injury claims of Jenkins' children. All the claims arose out of the same accident. 
Percival resisted the attempt to require him to arbitrate arguing that the arbitration may 
expose him to liability in excess of his policy limit. Percival further argued that the 
insurance adjuster lacked authority to waive his right of access to the courts. Although 
Jenkins, supra, addresses the issue of an arbitration agreement in the context of an 
insured's potential exposure to liability beyond his policy limits, Justice Stewart's 
reasoning and statements in that decision make it clear that absent a voluntary and 
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intelligent waiver by one holding a legal claim, access to the court shall be preserved for 
all injured persons. Jenkins, supra at 799. Specifically Justice Stewart stated that: 
The insurance contract between the insurance company and the insured does not 
authorize the adjuster to waive the individual rights of the insured. "The right to 
apply to the courts for relief for the perpetration of a wrong is a substantial right" 
and cannot be waived through contract except "in the most unequivocal terms." 
(quoting from Bracken v. Dahle, 251 P. 16, 20 (1926) As a result, the adjuster 
cannot unilaterally bind the insured to arbitration. Supra. 
In the instant case there is no factual or legal basis to allow Mr. Bybee to unilaterally bind 
Mrs. Bybee to an Agreement to Arbitrate. There is no evidence of an agency relationship either 
by agreement or by law. 
Because the court has decided the issues as set forth above, it is unnecessary to address the 
issues of whether the Arbitration Agreement is unconscionable or whether federal preemption is 
applicable. 
DATED this _5_ day of/Mojs/ , 2006. 
District Court Judge 
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